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Neuroliberalism: 
 
Cognition, Context, and the Geographical Bounding of Rationality 
 
 
Mark Whitehead, Rhys Jones, Jessica Pykett, Rachel Howell, Rachel Lilley 
 
 
Introduction: geography and neuroliberal government. !
 
The insights of the behavioural sciences have long been complicit within the acts of 
modern government (see Foucault, 2008 [2004]; Mettler, 2011; Nolan, 1998; Rose, 
1985; 1998). As a result of the emergence of behavioural economics, the last ten years 
have seen a conspicuous increase in the relative influence of these sciences within 
public policy-making (see Oliver, 2013a, 2017; Mettler, 2011; Shafir, 2013; Sunstein, 
2013; World Bank 2015; World Economic Forum, 2018: 56-57). In this regard, the 
UK has been in the behavioural vanguard. After coming to power in 2010, the UK’s 
Coalition Government instigated a systematic engagement with behavioural forms of 
intervention and established a Behavioural Insights Team (Behavioural Insights 
Team, 2011a; 2011b; Halpern, 2015; Hilton, 2014; (see John et al 2011; Jones et al 
2013). But these behavioural developments have not been confined to the UK. The 
Australian government’s Public Service Commission has been actively promoting the 
use of behavioural psychology within the design of public policy (Australian 
Government, 2007). In the USA, the Obama administration established the White 
House Social and Behavioral Sciences Team, which worked with various federal 
agencies to explore the effective application of behavioural insights within public 
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policy design1. Meanwhile countries as diverse as the Netherlands, Germany, Japan, 
Canada, Singapore, Guatemala, and Lebanon have all been active in the development 
of public policies that are informed by the behavioural sciences. At an international 
level, organizations including the European Commission, UNICEF, the World Bank, 
the OECD, EuropeAid, the World Economic Forum, and USAID are utilizing the 
insights of the behavioural sciences to address issues as diverse as loan repayments, 
fertilizer use, HIV/AIDS, and a range of public health and hygiene initiatives (see 
European Commission, 2013; Lunn, 2014; OECD, 2017; World Bank, 2015). In this 
paper, we propose a critical framework within which to analyze these governmental 
developments and consider the particular contributions that geographers can make to 
this project.  
 
The contemporary mobilization of the behavioural sciences within the practices of 
government is routinely described through the technical nomenclature of behaviour 
change, or behavioural insights. Critical analyses have attempted to interpret related 
strategies through the notion of the submerged state (Mettler, 2011), or 
psychologically rebooted systems of governmentality (Jones et al 2011). In this paper, 
we argue that the concept of neuroliberalism provides an alternative perspective 
through which to situate and critically analyze these novel modalities of behavioural 
government. We claim that while supporting critical interpretations of emerging 
forms of behavioural government, neuroliberalism can signal a move beyond 
relatively narrow concerns over the manipulative nature of related forms of power (as 
with accounts of the submerged state), while reworking the established assumptions 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 The work of this team was bolstered by the Presidential Executive Order -- Using Behavioral Science 
Insights to Better Serve the American People. This Executive Order that was issued by Barack 
Obama in 2015 compels federal agencies to fully realize the benefits of behavioral insights. 
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of human subjectivity that undergird theories of governmentality.  
 
Engin Isin was the first to suggest the concept of neuroliberalism (2004). For Isin, 
neuroliberalism is ‘[a] rationality of government that takes its subject as the ‘neurotic 
citizen’ and involves an orchestrated attempt to ‘govern through neurosis.’ Isin 
developed the concept of neuroliberalism as a response to work on neoliberal 
governmentality (see Dean, 1999; Rose, 1999) that emphasized the subjective 
capacities of self-reflection, calculation and rationality (Greco and Stenner, 2013)2. 
For Isin, neuroliberalism was important to the extent that it drew attention to the 
orchestration of emotions, desires and affects within the establishment of 
governmental power. While inspired by the work of Isin, our use and interpretation of 
neuroliberalism is a particular one. For us, neuroliberalism denotes systems of 
government that are primarily characterized by the mobilization of novel cognitive 
strategies, emotions, and pre-cognitive affects as a way of securing preferred forms of 
social conduct while ostensibly supporting liberal orthodoxies of freedom. 
 
We thus utilize the concept of neuroliberalism to describe the increasing capacity of 
states, corporations, and non-governmental organizations to govern through a series 
of more-than-rational registers of human action (including habits, heuristics, 
emotions, affects, and social and environmental contexts), and to skillfully fuse 
behavioural power with liberal notions of freedom. Critically, in this paper we do not 
see neuroliberalism as an ontological replacement of neoliberal government. Instead !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!2!Drawing on Horney’s (1991 [1950]) theories of neurosis, Isin’s work had two primary goals. First, he 
draws attention to the role of certain forms of emotions, desires and affects within the orchestration of 
governmental power. Second, and mobilizing Horney’s more sociologically oriented theory of 
neurosis, Isin explored the broader political and economic origins of emotional power, and thus 
challenged the narrow exploration of anxiety that was common within the psychological and the 
neurological sciences (see Greco and Stenner, 2013).   
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we are concerned with the varied ways in which neuropolitical developments shadow 
and interconnect with neoliberalism. In these contexts, we suggest that 
neuroliberalism embodies three dimensions: 1. A series of new scientific and 
intellectual perspectives on the nature of the human condition and how people should 
be governed; 2. An emerging, if still incoherent, set of government practices that 
connect behavioural power and liberalism; and 3. A context through which to analyze 
behaviourally informed styles of liberal government.  
 
We believe that neuroliberalism provides a framework for connecting together and 
evaluating the cumulative impacts of the behavioural, psychological, and 
neurosciences on the governmental targeting of more-than-rational life. In this paper, 
we focus primarily on a particular aspect of neuroliberalism, namely the impacts of 
behavioural economics on public policy. Behavioural economics reflects a creative 
fusion between cognitive psychology and economics, which has challenged many of 
the core assumptions of rationality associated with neoclassical economic thinking 
(Berndt, 2015). While representing only one expression of neuroliberalism, 
behavioural economics has arguably been the most influential school of new 
behavioural thinking when it comes to actually existing governmental policy.     
 
In addition to introducing the concept of neuroliberalism, a central aim of this paper is 
to explore the contributions that geographical scholarship can make to the area of 
inquiry neuroliberal government defines. The behavioural questions raised by the idea 
of neuroliberalism are directly, but often disjointedly, addressed within a broad 
swathe of existing geographical scholarship (see Avineri, 2012; Barr and 
Prillwitz, 2013; Berndt, 2015; Boeckler and Berndt, 2012; Carter, 2015; Gill and Gill, 
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2012; Jones et al 2011; Jones et al 2013; Pykett et al 2011; Strauss, 2009; Strauss, 
2008; Whitehead et al 2011). Drawing on this body of scholarship, we argue that an 
important dimension of any critical theory of neuroliberalism is an appreciation of its 
spatial parameters and assumptions. In particular, this paper reflects on the 
contribution that geographical scholarship can make to two important, if often 
overlooked, aspects of neuroliberalism: 1. the spatial qualities of behavioural context; 
and 2. geographical representations of irrationality. Focusing on these two 
perspectives, this paper uncovers key geographical contradictions and limitations that 
characterize neuroliberalism.   
 
This paper commences by unpacking the idea of neuroliberalism. The second part of 
this paper explores the question of behavioural context in relation to placed-based 
attempts to improve public health. The third section focuses on the application of 
neuroliberalism within international development policies and the problematic 
representations of irrationality this involves. The discussion in this paper has been 
informed by extensive documentary research and over 100 interviews conducted with 
policy-makers, academics, and other parties associated with the use of behavioural 
insights throughout the public, private and non-governmental sectors over a nine-year 
period3. This research was funded by the UK’s Leverhulme Trust and Economic and 
Social Research Council. 
 
On neuroliberal government. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 The full transcripts of some of these interviews, and related interview schedules and ethical 
consent forms, are available to download at the UK Data Service: 
http://reshare.ukdataservice.ac.uk/851870/ 
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Neuroliberalism is best thought of in three interconnected ways: as a theory of human 
subjectivity and action; as an ontological expression of emerging government forms; 
and as a context for analyzing emerging systems of behavioural government. We 
recognize that the suggested multidimensional forms of neuroliberalism could lead to 
the obfuscation of the term and promiscuity in its application (see Clarke, 2008). The 
dangers of obfuscation are, within our estimations at least, worth the risk. We claim 
that thinking of neuroliberalism in these multidimensional ways enables the 
simultaneous identification, association, and critical analysis of a series of disparate, 
but connected, governmental developments. This section outlines the different forms 
of neuroliberalism in turn. 
 
 
Neuroliberalism I: theoretical project. 
 
Put most simply, neuroliberalism is a form of behavioural government that is 
predicated upon novel theories of human subjectivity and action that challenge 
neoliberal orthodoxies. Neoliberal systems of government are based upon visions of 
human behaviour that assume rational traits of motivation and action (see Becker, 
1962). The so-called rationality assumption that sustains the neoliberal project asserts 
that people act on the basis of deliberative calculation and in the contexts of relative 
social isolation and self-interest (see Cohen, 2014). The presumption of rational 
human behaviour is sine qua non to the optimal allocation of resources and the 
avoidance of economic collusion, which are central to the neoliberal vision of society 
(Friedman, 2002). While recognized as a highly idealized interpretation of human 
behaviour, the rationality assumption is still seen by many to offer a close enough 
approximation of aggregate social conduct to be able to justify and support neoliberal 
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systems of government (cf. Thaler, 2015). Two processes have served to undermine 
the necessary myth of human rationality upon which neoliberalism rests. The first are 
a series of emerging studies at the interface of psychology and economics (this 
interdisciplinary space is now commonly referred to as behavioural economics 
(Heukelom, 2011; 2012; Oliver, 2013a; 2017; Sent, 2014). Second, are a number of 
real world crises that exposed the fallacious behavioural assumptions of 
neoliberalism. 
 
The first concerted challenge to the rationality assumption emerged out of the 
pioneering work on human decision-making by the polymath Herbert Simon. Simon 
challenged the presumption of rational action through the principle of bounded 
rationality. According to Simon, the bounding of human rationality was the product 
of both limited human cognitive capacities, and the fact that the real-world contexts in 
which we live rarely furnish us with the information we need to make optimal 
decisions (Simon, 1957). The early theoretical work of Herbert Simon was advanced 
during the 1970s and 80s by a group of psychologists and economists who were 
interested in the empirical foundations of economic decision-making. The most 
prominent members of this new thought collective were Daniel Kahnemen, Amos 
Tversky and Richard Thaler (Lewis, 2016; Sent, 2014; Thaler, 2015). Together these 
writers would help to lay the foundations for the field of behavioural economic study 
(see Sent, 2014). Behavioural economics challenges neo-classical economic theory on 
the basis of its presumption of rationality, and because of its collective neglect of 
empirical studies into actually existing human behaviours (Oliver, 2013a: 7; Strauss, 
2008; 2009). Through empirical studies of economic decision-making in a range of 
contexts, behavioural economists demonstrated consistent deviations from the 
! 8!
behaviours expected within neoclassical economic orthodoxy (Kahneman, 2012; 
Kahneman et al 1982; Thaler, 2015; Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). These deviant 
behaviours generally include a tendency to follow the social herd; to prefer status quo 
to behavioural change; and to prioritize present over future needs (John et al 2011). 
These systematic behavioural patterns were often acknowledged within economic 
theory but dismissed as ‘true but unimportant’ or ‘supposedly irrelevant factors’ 
(SIFs) (see Thaler, 2015). Over time, however, behavioural economists have provided 
ever more detailed studies of these cognitive biases and behavioural heuristics, which 
have made them difficult to ignore.   
 
If behavioural economics provided a key scientific basis for neuroliberalism, its 
popularization was clearly driven by a series of interconnected crises of neoliberal 
society. Central among these crises was the Credit Crunch of 2008, and subsequent 
Great Recession (Akerlof and Schiller, 2010). According to Akerlof and Schiller, the 
Sub Prime Crisis and Credit Crunch embodied the global aggregation of the irrational 
behaviours (particularly the misapprehension of risk) that behavioural economists had 
been describing for two decades (see also Deutsche Bank, 2010; Boeckler and Berndt, 
2012). Given that neoliberal theory could not account for its own failings, increasing 
credence was given to the notion that the crisis could be a product of the supposedly 
irrelevant behavioural factors it had routinely ignored. Following neuroliberal 
interpretations of the economic crises of neoliberalism, a series of problems within 
neoliberal society are now being read in similar behavioural terms. It is now, 
consequently, common to see climate change (Marshall, 2015), obesity (De Ridder, 
2013), gambling (Gobet and Schiller, 2014), and global poverty (Mullainathan and 
Shafir 2013; World Bank, 2015) being explained through the sciences of 
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neuroliberalism (Legget, 2014).     
 
It is our contention in this paper that neuroliberalism has emerged as both a scientific 
rebuke to the assumptions of neoliberal economic thinking and a set of practical 
responses to its observed crises. We assert, however, that far from being a rejection of 
neoliberal thinking, neuroliberalism embodies a creative adaptation of the market-
oriented norms of neoliberalism. Moreover, we claim that the geographical 
assumptions of neuroliberalism are central to its ability to simultaneously critique and 
re-valorize market-oriented systems of government and behavior. Before we explore 
this point further, it is necessary to outline the practical forms and manifestations of 
neuroliberalism as an actually existing system of government. 
 
Neuroliberalism II: Government Practice. 
 
If the scientific foundations of neuroliberalism can be located in behavioural 
economics, its practical inspirations derive from the principles of libertarian 
paternalism (or nudge as it is commonly known) (see Thaler and Sunstein, 2008; 
Sunstein, 2014). Libertarian paternalism has two primary components. Its paternalist 
instincts are based upon the behavioural economic insights that humans often act 
irrationally against their own best interests and therefore require certain forms of 
support in decision-making processes. It is libertarian to the extent that it seeks to 
ensure that an individual’s freedom (usually expressed in their right to choose) is not 
undermined by behavioural government (Sunstein, 2014). To put things another way, 
libertarian paternalism embodies a practical expression of neuroliberal government to 
the extent that it acknowledges (and exploits) human irrationality to serve collective 
behavioural goals (its neuro-logical component), while seeking to preserve aspects of 
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human autonomy (its liberal aspect).    
 
As a governmental project, libertarian paternalism has three key tropes: its targets 
(including emotions, habits, automatic forms of decision-making, and social norms 
inter alia); its vectors of operation (for example, peer-networks, choice environments, 
anchoring, data framing, and contagion); and its methodologies of evaluation 
(including randomized control trials, sentiment analysis, and non-critical audit). 
These tropes come together in a range of initiatives, which seek to reshape the choice 
environments that shape people’s everyday life, in order to make it easier for people 
to make decisions that support purportedly more healthy, financially secure, and 
environmentally sustainable lives (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). The second half of this 
paper will consider precisely what related neuroliberal strategies involve through a 
discussion of two policy areas: public health and international development. At this 
point, however, it is pertinent to observe that neuroliberal policies have been 
employed in a broad range of public policy areas (see Behavioural insights Team, 
2011a; 2011b; 2012; Social and Behavioural Sciences Team, 2016).   
 
While neuroliberalism has been associated with the reshaping of the forms and 
functions of key areas of front line public policy, it has also offered a framework for 
evaluating government actions and failures in back office operations within the deep 
state (see Galley et al 2013; World Bank 2015). The Canadian government and the 
World Bank have both considered the different ways in which the scientific insights 
associated with neuroliberalism could be used to combat predictable forms of 
irrationality and error exhibited by governmental personnel (Galley et al 2013; World 
Bank 2015). In more concrete terms, Oliver (2013b) has suggested that neuroliberal 
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insights could be used to better understand and correct governmental overreaction to 
crises. In his analysis of the UK government’s response to the Swine Flu pandemic, 
for example, Oliver suggests that the “overreaction” that was observed (and which 
saw the National Health Service spend £1.2 billion (1% of its total annual budget) on 
prevention treatment) was a product of ambiguity aversion: a psychological tendency 
to overestimate the impacts of things that have a significant amount of uncertainty 
surrounding them (2013b: 16-31).   
 
Neuroliberalism III: Towards a Critical Framework. 
 
In addition to acting as a reference point for new theories of human subjectivity and 
government practice, we argue that neuroliberalism could offer a basis to develop a 
critical theory of emerging processes of behavioural government. When we speak of a 
critical theory of neuroliberalism we are referring to something analytically specific. 
A specifically critical theory of neuroliberalism could offer three important analytical 
perspectives on emerging systems of behavioural government: 1. an interdisciplinary 
perspective; 2. an abstract orientation (with a particular concern with identifying 
contradictions in totalizing governmental practices); and 3. a focus on how things 
could be different (Brenner, 2009). It may seem strange to talk of a critical theory of 
neuroliberalism as being interdisciplinary, given that the neuroliberal project is 
already an inherently interdisciplinary affair. In keeping with critical studies more 
generally, however, a critical theory of neuroliberalism would entail a form of 
interdisciplinarity that moves beyond the predominantly technocratic and positivist 
zones of the psychological and design sciences. It is a form of interdisciplinarity that 
combines positivist questions of efficacy with broader metaphysical questions of 
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purpose and ethics. More specifically—and as we argue below—it is an 
interdisciplinary project that would benefit in very specific ways from an engagement 
with key concerns within human geography, and the interdisciplinary that is itself 
evident within the discipline of geography. 
 
A critical theory of neuroliberalism would also entail a decidedly abstract form of 
analytical orientation. The abstract orientation of a critical theory of neuroliberalism 
is important because it interrupts the narrow empiricism that characterizes much of 
the science and practices of contemporary behavioural government. As with 
neoliberalism, neuroliberal government appears set on establishing what Davis has 
referred to as a political physics which ‘seeks to replace moral rules […] with 
scientific rules […] shift[ing] questions of normativity elsewhere, into the spheres of 
expert procedure and methodology’ (2104: 15). This is a brand of empiricism that 
denies the existence of that which cannot be measured in the quantitative moment of 
the psychological and economic sciences. Denying the metaphysical context within 
which behavioural government is conducted closes of key moral debates and reduces 
the scope within which it is possible to discern the role of non-local forces in shaping 
observed behavioural patterns (this is an issue we return to in our discussion of 
behavioural context below).  
 
The final key dimension of a critical theory of neuroliberalism is the emphasis it 
brings to the contingency of the present—or how things could be different. While 
contingency may be a common theme within many branches of contemporary social 
sciences, the sciences and practices of neuroliberalism appear to leave only limited 
scope to explore the malleability of the present. While neuroliberalism is clearly 
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predicated on a project of change, this change is limited in two key ways. First, 
neuroliberalism often operates in denial of the opportunity that individuals have to 
shape their own behavioural destiny in creative and empowering ways. Second, as a 
set of scientific and government practices neuroliberalism is an exceptionally 
conformist project to the extent that it remains actively disinterested in the role that 
broader forms of social transformation can play in facilitating and shaping behaviour 
change (John, 2018: 10).  
 
At this point it is important to consider the connections and parallels that exist 
between neuroliberalism and perhaps the most significant critical theory of 
behavioural government of the last decade: governmentality. Theories of neoliberal 
governmentality have already been deployed in order to develop critical perspectives 
on the systems of behavioural government that are associated with neuroliberalism 
(see Jones et al 2011). It is our contention that as a distinctly liberal system of 
government, which seeks to govern (at both an individual and population level) in and 
through systems of personal freedom, neuroliberalism embodies an adapted form of 
neoliberal governmentality (Foucault 2008 [2004]; Foucault 2007 [2004]). As a 
regime of governmentality, neuroliberalism also reflects the continuing desire to 
provide forms of biopolitical care for a population (Foucault 2008 [2004]).4 It is, 
however, now well established that neoliberal governmentality is a system of 
government that seeks to ‘minimize costs and maximize profits’ (Cook, 2016: 142). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 It is interesting to note that in his 1978 lecture series at the Collège de France, entitled The Birth of 
Biopolitics, Foucault anticipated a form of neuroliberal governmentality (Foucault 2008 [2004]: 268-
271). According to Foucault, the emerging realization within neoliberal economics in the 1960s that the 
body of actions defined as “irrational” actually reflects a surprisingly predictable set of non-random 
acts had significant implications for how it might be possible to govern liberal societies (ibid: 269-
270). Foucault essentially discerns within the economic study of irrationality the potential for a new 
model of psychologically imbued neoliberal governmentality that would emerge thirty years later (ibid: 
270). 
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The minimization of costs is, in part, achieved on the basis of a reduced role for 
governments within the provision of collective forms of welfare. The maximization of 
profits is secured within neoliberal governmentality on the basis of individuals taking 
ever greater responsibility for reflective forms of self-government, and personal 
improvement, which enhance both their productivity and wellbeing (Rose, 1999). It is 
on these terms of reference that neuroliberalism expands the potential scope of 
inquiry associated with neoliberal governmentality. First, neuroliberalism raises 
questions about neoliberal assumptions that individuals can effectively self-govern 
through systems of reflexive rationality. In this context, neuroliberalism supports the 
further development of theories of governmentality that consider how irrationality 
becomes an object of self-governing reflectivity, and a target for new systems of 
biopolitical government. Second, and in the context of the Credit Crunch and Great 
Recession, neuroliberal perspectives questions whether a non-interventionist state is 
actually cost effective within society. To these ends, the critical theory of 
neuroliberalism proposed in this paper builds on established concerns within theories 
of governmentality, but also seeks to draw particular attention to how the governing 
of irrational behaviours is being informed by new theories of both the self and state.   
 
Neuroliberalism in Critical Geographical Perspective: Context and Spatial 
Representations of Irrationality. 
 
In one of the most detailed discussions of the relationship between geography and 
behavioural economics, Kendra Strauss explores the creative overlaps that exist 
between (economic) geography and neuroliberal theories of human nature (Strauss, 
2008). Strauss’s analysis is interesting because it not only considers the utility of 
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incorporating behavioural economics into geography, but also why this process has 
been so ponderously pursued. According to Strauss, behavioural economists’ assault 
on the rationality assumption of neo-classical economics mirrors behavioural 
geography’s attempts to ‘humanize the economic’ in the early 1970s (ibid: 137-138). 
The fact that behavioural geography has subsequently been rejected within critical 
economic geography—in favour of more socially and culturally embedded accounts 
of economic activity— has, however, made it difficult for an effective dialogue to be 
established between geography and the neuroliberal sciences (ibid). Strauss claims 
that the insights of behavioural economics could now be used to draw renewed (and 
nuanced) attention to behaviour at a time when critical economic geography has lost 
sight of the individual (ibid: 138). In what remains of this paper, we consider the 
potential for establishing a dialogue between various strands of critical geography and 
neuroliberal inquiry, and the potential contributions that geography could make to the 
development of a critical theory of neuroliberalism.  
 
Neuroliberalism and the problem of context.      
 
One of the key nexus points between geography and neuroliberal thought is the notion 
of context. Context matters in neuroliberal thought in two main ways. First, the 
behavioural subject at the heart of the neuroliberal project is one that is inherently 
context dependent. Unlike homo economicus, who exists in a form of frictionless 
space of desert-island like isolation, the neuroliberal subject’s gestalt is contextual 
(Cohen, 2014) (although, as we argue below, neuroliberalism deploys an ultimately 
thin understanding of context). The neuroliberal citizen’s behaviour is seen to be 
shaped by social context (and in particular peer pressure and herd instincts), material 
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environments, decision-making frames, and the general push of the world around 
them (Kahneman, 2012). Second, context is the primary vector for neuroliberal 
attempts to change and regulate human behaviour (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). 
Consequently, through the careful development and orchestration of choice 
architectures in everyday environments of various kinds (including school canteens, 
doctors’ surgeries, streets, and staircases), neuroliberalism pursues behavioural 
government not by changing the subject directly, but by subtly altering the world that 
surrounds (as a route to ultimately changing behaviour). Neuroliberalism’s focus on 
context—and in particular the notion of choice architectures and environments—not 
only reflects the epistemological assumptions of emerging behavioural insights, but is 
central to the political orientation of the neuroliberal project (see Sunstein, 2014). 
Changing contexts in order to change behaviours is politically significant to 
neuroliberalists to the extent that it enables them to preserve the liberal values of 
personal freedom and choice: while the behavioural context may change, the 
opportunity for personal autonomy remains (ibid).  
 
A concern with context has also, been a defining characteristic of geographical 
inquiry since the inception of the discipline. Geographers routinely embrace the 
methodological mission of contextualizing more generalized insights concerning the 
nature of power, knowledge, and being within space. More specifically, the contextual 
approach within geography has consistently sought to interpret social life through an 
ontological commitment to the world as a series of evolving connections between 
people and things in space and time (Simonsen, 1991). According to Strauss (2009), 
although behavioural economists have sought to build more holistic and contextually 
oriented accounts of decision-making (which includes intuition, emotion, and 
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imagination inter alia), their epistemological and methodological assumptions tend to 
critically limit ‘the theorization of the context of decision making’ (303). Strauss goes 
as far as to say that within behavioural economics at least, ‘context itself is 
underdetermined and remains largely untheorized’ (2008: 143). In order to better 
understanding the limitations of the contextual interpretations associated with 
neuroliberalism it is instructive to consider an example of neuroliberalism in 
(contextual) practice. An appropriate example is provided by Carter’s analysis of the 
fusing of nudges and neoliberalism in the US Blue Zones initiative.  
 
According to Carter, the Blue Zone Project ‘is a placed-based, community centred, 
and commercial health promotion enterprise’ that has been implemented in a growing 
number of US states and cities (2015: 374)5. The Blue Zones project is based on the 
assumption that if we spend 90% of our time in the same everyday places, changing 
these places, and what we do in them, is central to living a healthy life (Blue Zone 
Project, 2017). At the heart of the project is the desire to transform places in such a 
way that it becomes easier to be healthy (ibid). The Blue Zone project reflects a 
geographical expression of neuroliberalism to the extent that it uses small 
environmental adaptations so as to gently bias context in order to promote behaviours 
that support good physical and mental health (Carter, 2015: 375-376). A central 
vision within this neuroliberal environmental strategy is to deconvenience everyday 
spaces (ibid: 377). The Blue Zones Project’s contextual strategy involves ‘[cities] 
build[ing] more sidewalks; citizens pledg[ing] to ‘“deconvenience” their lives, for 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 The title Blue Zones comes from Dan Buettner’s 2008 book Blue Zones. In this book Blue 
Zones refer to those places in the world—such as Sardinia and Okinawa—where life 
expectancy is on average much higher than the rest of the world (the colour blue is significant 
here only to the extent that it is the colour that it used to mark out these “longevity hotspots” 
on maps (Carter, 2015: 376)).  
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example by walking more and using shovels instead of snowblowers; school 
cafeterias, supermarkets, and restaurants were persuaded to offer healthier menu items 
[…]’ (ibid: 377). The Blue Zone Project uses neuroliberal tactics in two key ways: 1. 
it targets environmental contexts as the basis for behavioural government; 2. in 
seeking to enable people to ‘mindlessly move [their] way to better health’ (Blue Zone 
LLC, 2013) it targets the human unconscious (Jones et al 2013).  
 
Carter develops an interesting, contextually-oriented critique of this particular form of 
neuroliberal programme. According to Carter, 
“BZP [Blue Zone Project] promotes a thoroughly desocialized discourse about 
creating healthy communities. The BZP assiduously avoids contemplation of 
thorny structural determinants of health, such as income and wealth, educational 
attainment, employment status, or race and ethnicity’ (2015: 380). 
 
Carter’s critique suggests that while neuroliberal policies re-contextualize human 
behaviour in certain ways (particularly with regard to the development of local 
physical infrastructures and community norms), it continues to decontextualize in 
others (specifically class, race and ethnic relations). Carter’s analysis resonates with 
other critiques of neuroliberal policies (see Jones et al, 2013; Strauss, 2008; 2009). 
What these geographical critiques have in common is that they recognize 
neuroliberalism’s attempts to re-contextualize behavioural problems (such as health), 
while they also draw attention to the broader neoliberal tendency to de-socialize 
understanding of these issues.   
 
Carter’s analysis of the shortcomings of neuroliberalism has much in common with 
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Strauss’s attempts to build a contextually based rapprochement between geography 
and behavioural economics (2009). According to Strauss, while behavioural 
economics (and by extension neuroliberalism) supports a fairly anemic contextual 
perspective,  
‘[a] geographical conception of context as the decision-making environment 
encapsulates the permeable and mutable scales implicated in the decision-
making ‘moment’. Thus, the articulation of space and place as part of the 
conceptual working through of the notion of context must include the scalar 
range of individual experience: from the individual to the global, from the 
intimate to the distanced, from embodied to disembodied forms of experience’ 
(2009: 308-09).  
 
Strauss thus asserts the importance of incorporating an appreciation of processes that 
operate at multiple contextual scales (including embodied experience, physical 
locality, company practices, national policies, and global financial markets) (ibid). 
Geographers have similarly argued that more attention should be paid to where these 
contextual scales meet – connecting situated and embodied practices with the geo-
historical contextual rationalities in which the neurosciences have emerged as 
dominant explanatory frames for a range of social and policy phenomena (Pykett, 
2015). Crucially, this perspective (in keeping with Carter’s), does not suggest that 
neuroliberal insights (particularly at the level of human cognition of choice 
environment) are not of value to geographical enquiry, but that on their own, they can 
only offer limited forms of explanation for human conduct (and its capacity to be 
governed).   
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From this perspective, it is instructive to consider the more specific connections and 
divergences that exist between neuroliberalism and geographical approaches to 
context. A helpful point of departure for this endeavour is Simonsen’s (1991) 
geographical analysis of the contextuality of human action and life. In her attempt to 
reinvigorate the notion of context within geographical inquiry, Simonsen counters 
overly structuralist accounts human life by introducing more subjectively oriented 
interpretations of action. Drawing on broadly Lefebvrian and Giddensian frameworks 
of social time and space, Simonsen identifies three dimensions of contextual 
temporality: longue durée (best understood in relation to trans-generational forms and 
institutions); lifespan; and the durée of daily life (in particular routines and habits) 
(ibid: 427). Paralleling these, Simonsen proposes three aspects of contextual 
spatiality: institutional spatial practices (namely the structural and collective 
production of space); place (the sphere of the human attachment of meaning to space 
and the conscious appropriation of the surrounding environment); and individual 
spatial practice (the zone of spatialized habits, physical presence, and routine 
interaction) (ibid: 428). Crucially, Simonsen claims that it is at the intersection of 
these different dimensions of context that the ‘concrete production of social 
individuals’ occurs (ibid: 429). To put things perhaps more simply, it is not so much 
that individual action is conditioned by context, but that subjectivity (in both its 
conscious and unconscious forms) is itself is a product of contextuality.  
 
Neuroliberal approaches to temporal context tend to ignore the longue durée concerns 
that frame human action. The possible exception to this is the neuroliberal interest in 
social norms. While social norms could be interpreted as inter-generational contextual 
phenomena, they tend to be approached within neuroliberalism as relatively recent 
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and highly malleable social conditions. Neuroliberal policies do display some 
sensitivity to the lifespan dynamics of context particularly in relation to recognizing 
how particular moments in life (such as moving home, having your first child, or 
going to college) provide opportunities for behavioral modification; or how our 
inability to effectively relate to our future selves prevents effective planning for our 
future needs. The sensitivity to lifespan displayed by neuroliberal policies tends, 
however, to focus more on how our biography provides opportunities for isolated 
behavioural prompts (i.e. life-stage interventions), rather than recognizing how 
lifespan experiences shape our behavioral orientations in more continuous ways. 
Neuroliberal approaches to temporal context tend to focus predominantly on the durée 
of daily life where our habits, routines, and customs become the target of behavioural 
interventions. Critically, however, neuroliberalism’s concern with the temporalities of 
daily life (from commuting to work to our bedtime cycles) tends to ignore the ways in 
which these behavioural patterns are an emerging part of the unfurling of inter-
generational and lifespan contexts. 
 
In relationship to the key dimensions of spatial context, neuroliberalism tends to 
underestimate the institutional spatial practices that shape geography over relatively 
long periods of time and over large spatial scales. Neuroliberal government’s lack of 
concern with institutional spatial practices is demonstrated most clearly by its 
tendency to assume the ease with which space can be transformed, and a 
predisposition to focus on changing choice architectures at relative small scales. 
Neuroliberalism has a somewhat duplicitous relationship with the contextual power of 
place. As evidenced in the discussion of the Blue Zone Project above, 
neuroliberalism’s emphasis on the creation of unconscious environmental cues to 
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action, tends to mean it downplays the significance of conscious social attachments to 
place (Carter, 2015). In other iterations, however, neuroliberal policies actively 
engage in the production of visibly meaningful places (in direct contrast to the 
ubiquitous non-spaces of modernity) as prompts for certain forms of behavioural 
action (this is particularly evident in policies which target anti-social behaviour of 
different kinds) (see Jones et al’s 2013 for an analysis of the DIY Streets movement in 
the UK). The primary spatial focus of neuroliberalism’s contextual strategies is the 
sphere of individual spatial practice. When combined with its focus on the durée of 
daily life, this means that neuroliberalism’s contextual project tends to focus on the 
most proximate spatial and temporal determinants of human conduct.   
 
There are several key insights that can be gained from a consideration of 
neuroliberalist contextual assumptions. The first is that within neuroliberalism context 
tends to be used as a tool of behavioural government and not as a hermeneutic 
framework for behavourial inquiry. This is precisely why we see such a strong 
contextual focus on the micro times and spaces of daily life and individual spatial 
practice. When neuroliberalism, does concern itself with meso-level contextual 
horizons, such as lifespans and place-formations, it tends to do so in order to change 
short-term conduct, and not to better understand longer-term drivers of human action. 
Neuroliberalism’s lack of concern with macro-level contextual considerations is 
significant not only because of the clear epistemological lacuna it generates, but also 
because of what it tells us about the political orientation of the project—and its likely 
efficacy as a system of behavioral government. Politically it signals the relatively 
conformist nature (neuroliberalists prefer the term radical incrementalism) of the 
neuroliberal project, as it ignores key strategic and structural determinants of social 
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life. According to Simonsen, ‘the problem of contextuality is closely related to the 
problem of the mediation between structure and agency’ (1991: 43). 
Neuroliberalism’s focus on the micro-contexts of life does not just mean that it under-
estimates the power of more-than-local forces in conditioning human agency, but that 
it overemphasizes the agency of government projects to meaningful shape conduct 
through context.   
 
This paper asserts that the theorization of context is one of the key contributions that 
geography and geographers can make to critical analyses of neuroliberalism. 
Ultimately, this could lead to a more radical recasting of how we understand the 
relationship between human behaviour and context that challenges simplistic 
depictions of behaviour as isolated moments that can be easily ascribed to discrete 
actors. According to the work of Strauss, however, context offers more than a route 
for critical geographical scrutiny of neuroliberal government (2008; 2009). Context 
can also offer an inter-disciplinary conduit through which emerging psychological 
insights into human cognition can enlighten geographical inquiry, while geographical 
concerns with time and space can inform neuroliberalism. For Strauss, this 
interdisciplinary project is about more than a theoretical dialogue, it is also a basis to 
promote multimethod studies of cognition and context: as the logical deductive 
experimentalism of psychology is fused with the forms of quantitative and qualitative 
methods that support geographical inquiry into multi-scalar contexts (Strauss, 2008: 
312; see also Clark et al, 2012).      
 
Neuroliberalism and the Geographical Representations of Irrationality 
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The previous section focused on the ways in which neuroliberalism situates human 
behaviour at the interface of our cognitive limitations and contextual circumstances.  
This section focuses on another key, if often implicit, geographical dimension of 
neuroliberal thought and action: the geographical representations of irrationality. 
While the contextual drivers of human irrationality are openly discussed within 
neuroliberal discourse, neuroliberalism carries with it generally unacknowledged 
assumptions about the spatialization of irrationality. These spatial imaginaries of 
irrationality often invoke notions of backwardness and marginality (Berndt, 2015; 
Jones et al 2013). Moreover, neuroliberal geographical imaginations of the irrational 
often also carry with them assumptions concerning the normative value of market 
integration and compliance (Boeckler and Berndt, 2012). Focusing on the application 
of neuroliberalism within international development policy, and building on the work 
of the economic geographer Christian Berndt, this section explores the fusing of 
geographical imaginations with neuroliberal visions of the irrational.  
 
Various strands of international development policies are displaying the hallmarks of 
neuroliberalist thinking and action. Recent research has revealed that prominent 
international development organizations including USAID, UNICEF, EuropeAid, the 
WHO, UNESCO, the United Nations Development Programme, and AusAid are 
utilizing neuroliberal styles of policy to support their international development work 
(Whitehead et al 2014). This research has revealed that related initiatives have been 
applied in a wide range of policy areas including the promotion of fertilizer use, 
public health initiatives (particularly those combating HIV/AIDs and diarrhea), and 
various saving and investment schemes (ibid). A key moment in the emergence of a 
neuroliberal international development policy regime was the publication of the 
! 25!
World Bank’s 2015 World Development Report Mind, Society and Behaviour. This 
report directly challenges the neoclassical rationality assumptions that formed a 
crucial part of the Bank’s neoliberal past and suggests ways in which the insights of 
the behavioural and psychological sciences could be applied to a range of 
development issues including poverty alleviation, early childhood development, and 
climate change mitigation (World Bank, 2015: 4-5).  
 
What is particularly interesting about emerging neuroliberal development policies are 
the ways in which they creatively fuse psychological insights into the nature of human 
irrationality, with imaginations of space, and assumptions about market processes. 
The recent work of Berndt has focused specific attention on these interconnected 
themes (see Berndt, 2015; see also Boeckler and Berndt, 2012). Berndt has studied 
key international policy documents produced by the World Bank, OECD, and FAO, 
which seek to apply the insights of behavioural economics to anti-poverty initiatives 
in rural settings. We believe that the appropriate elaboration of Berndt’s work has 
significant implications for the development of a geographically informed critical 
theory of neuroliberalism.  
 
At the centre of Berndt’s analysis is a recognition of the different comprehensions of 
the impoverished citizen that characterize neoliberal and neuroliberal world views. 
Neoliberal development policies treat those in poverty as if they have nothing 
behaviourally special about them: namely that they can perform their role as rational 
actors within systems of market exchange as competently (or indeed incompetently) 
as the wealthy (ibid: 577). Neuroliberalism (and the behavioural economic research it 
is often based upon) suggests, however, that ‘the poor’ are marked by distinctive 
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behavioural shortcomings, that are a product of the cognitive toll that impoverishment 
places upon them. These neuroliberal assumptions are clearly evidenced in the World 
Bank’s Mind, Society and Behaviour report. The Report states ‘[w]hen individuals are 
under cognitive strain, it is even more difficult to activate the deliberative system. 
Poverty, time pressure, and financial stress all can cause cognitive strain’ (World 
Bank, 2015: 27).         
 
In order to demonstrate the cognitive limitations associated with poverty, the World 
Bank discusses the example of sugar cane farmers India. The Bank reflects on 
cognitive tests that were carried out on these farmers before and after harvest periods: 
with pre-harvest periods being associated with the accumulation of debt and 
immediate post-harvest periods associated with an easing of financial strain (ibid: 
2015: 27; see Mani et al 2013). These tests revealed that not only did the farmers 
perform less well in cognitive processes during periods of poverty, but that the 
difference in scores between pre- and post-harvest performance was roughly the same 
as three quarters of the deficit that an individual accrues when they lose a whole 
night’s sleep (ibid).  Neuroliberal solutions to such cognitive problems revolve around 
the use of psychological devices that can make it easier for farmers to act in their own 
long-term interests, even when their immediate impoverishment makes this difficult. 
The World Bank thus supports the use of framing, anchoring, re-setting defaults, 
simplification techniques, and peer pressure within development policies related to 
the promotion of fertilizer use, loan products, and agricultural investment (World 
Bank, 2015: 26-75).    
 
It is reasonable to assert that the particular psychological costs of poverty are now 
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well-established within development economics and policy-making (see Mullainathan 
and Shafir, 2013). While acknowledging the behavioural problems that are generated 
by poverty may be a welcome challenge to neo-classical assumptions, there are 
political and ideological dangers that reside in the connections that are being forged 
between irrationality and poverty. Exposing the links between irrationality and 
poverty can often result in subtle shifts in the equations of causality that connect these 
two conditions. It is thus one thing to recognize that poverty produces forms of 
irrationality (which can perpetuate poverty in the long term), it is quite another to 
assume that the neuroliberal mitigation of irrationality is enough to tackle the longer 
term contextual drivers of global poverty. Berndt describes this policy change as ‘a 
shift of attention from the market to the market subject, that is from market failure to 
behavioural failure, and from market regulation to behavioural engineering’ (2015: 
569).  
 
It is our contention that the emerging connections that are being made between 
poverty and irrationality open-up the possibility for a distinctively geographical 
critique of neuroliberal poverty alleviation policies. According to Berndt, behavioural 
policies are producing new geographical imaginations of irrationality, which rather 
than questioning the operation of markets, are able to reaffirm markets as the solution 
to enduring regimes of poverty (ibid: 584). Berndt asserts that these geographical 
representations of irrationality see, 
 
“On the one side […] the ‘poor’, reduced to ‘indigenous’, ‘local’ and ‘traditional’ 
knowledge, populating a world characterized by small scale and traditional 
agriculture. On the other side we have ‘the non-poor’, trained and educated, 
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involved in large-scale production using sophisticated farming methods. On the 
one side are poor small-holders, on the other entrepreneurial farmers. Dualist 
representations like this are particularly strong the closer ones get to the 
implementation stage’ (ibid: 579). 
 
Such representations of irrationality see neuroliberalism take an overt geographical 
form, with certain (non-market oriented) places becoming associated with forms of 
indigenous irrationality, while other, more entrepreneurial, locations are seen as 
bastions of reason. Such geographical imaginations are in many ways not so much 
neuroliberal as neurocolonial, to the extent that they not only connect poverty with 
irrationality, but ‘traditional societies’ with a lack of reasoning capacity. It does 
appear that the World Bank is wary of neuroliberalism becoming neurocolonial. They 
consistently emphasize that the cognitive limitations identified within neuroliberal 
sciences are as much a feature of World Bank staff as those that they work with 
(2015: 4). At the same time, however, the report emphasizes the persistent inabilities 
of development professionals to grasp the mental models of the poor (ibid: 180-190).  
 
What is most significant about neuroliberalism’s emerging geographical imagery is 
what it tells us about the spatial assumptions of such policies. While the distasteful 
neurocolonialism of such representations may catch the attention, this can distract 
from the epistemological work that such imaginaries do. It is not just that 
neuroliberalism appears to equate irrationality with local, traditional and indigenous 
spaces, but it suggests that these spaces actively inhibit cognitive development. 
According to Berndt, many neuroliberal policies are predicated on the assumption that 
it is because these spaces do not expose inhabitants to market forces that rationality is 
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unable to develop (Berndt, 2015: 581). This reveals an assumed geographical 
bounding of rationality. The notion of the geographical bounding of rationality adds a 
problematic spatial dimension to the concept of bounded rationality that emerged at 
the beginning of the neuroliberal project (Strauss, 2008). The geographical bounding 
of irrationality in this way serves important political and economic purposes. First, it 
disconnects evident irrationality and poverty in one place from the impacts of market 
development in another. From a critical geographical perspective, this fails to 
recognize the uneven geographies of economic development that emphasize the 
necessary connections between market success in one place, and under-development 
in another. Second, it asserts that the solution to the problems associated with the 
spaces of impoverished irrationality is exposure to market forces. In addition to 
representing a form of structural adjustment policy operating at a neurological level, 
this assertion makes troubling assumptions about the very nature of rationality. 
Equating rationality with market-oriented reasoning, not only denies the possibility 
that reason may be found in non-market oriented actions (such as reciprocity and care 
giving), it also fails to recognize how irrational actions can actually reflect sensible 
adaptive responses to particular circumstances (Gigerenzer, 2014).      
 
Ultimately, the emerging connections that are being made between international 
development policies and understandings of irrationality signal critical contributions 
that geographers can make to the analysis of the spatial imaginaries of 
neuroliberalism. These are contributions that not only draw attention to emerging 
patterns of neurocolonialism, but also the geographical bounding of rationality. To 
these ends, geographers can play an important role in exposing the arbitrary 
assumptions concerning reason, irrationality, and market forces that often flow from 
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neuroliberal discourse.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
 
This paper has had two primary aims. First, it has proposed and unpacked the notion 
of neuroliberalism as a context for analyzing emerging forms of behavioural 
government. Second, it has explored the particular contributions that geography can 
make to the critical analysis of neuroliberalism and the systems of psychological 
power it has become associated with. In relation to the first aim of this paper, analysis 
has outlined the main ways in which neuroliberalism could contribute to the study of 
emerging systems of behavioural government. In one context, Neuroliberalism offers 
an integrative framework through which to connect together a series of scientific 
insights and governmental techniques through which it is becoming increasingly 
common to use psychological techniques to govern people in free societies. The 
integrative potential of neuroliberalism represents an important starting point in 
attempts to try and make sense of the proliferation of new strategies for behavioural 
government. In another context, it has been proposed that a critical theory of 
neuroliberalism could offer a valuable context in and through which to analyze 
emerging systems of behavioural government. Developing a critical theory of 
neuroliberalism appears to be particularly significant given the ethical issues that 
related practices raise, and the lack of metaphysical perspective that is evident within 
the sciences of neuroliberalism. The policies associated with neuroliberal styles of 
government often celebrate their lack of abstraction and assert their pragmatic 
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orientation. A Critical theory of neuroliberalism can, however, help to expose the 
likely practical failings of such systems of government, as well as revealing their 
conformist inability to address engrained forms of uneven development and injustice.  
 
In relation to the second aim of this paper, analysis has introduced existing work that 
has sought to connect geographical concerns with neuroliberal processes. Particular 
attention has been drawn to the questions of context and geographical representations 
of irrationality. The analysis presented here reveals that while neuroliberalism is a 
contextually oriented project, its mobilizations of contextual factors ignores 
(inadvertently, or otherwise) long-term temporal issues and large-scale spatial 
processes. Through a consideration of existing analyses of neuroliberal policies for 
international development this paper has also explored an apparent lack of awareness 
of the forms of geographical representations they promote, and the neurocolonial and 
neuroresponsibilising undercurrents this supports. What unites these critical 
geographical perspectives on context and spatial representation is that they reveal the 
ways in which geography, in particular, plays a crucial role in enabling 
neuroliberalists to justify their actions on the basis of the failures of markets, only to 
use their policies to promote market norms.  
 
Ultimately this paper proposes that the notion of neuroliberalism offers geographers a 
novel perspective on emerging forms of psychological power and potentially valuable 
insights into human motivation and action. Furthermore, we claim that geographers 
have much to offer evaluative and critical interpretations of neuroliberalism. It 
appears likely in the combined wake of the crises of neoliberalism, and the enduring 
power of market systems, that neuroliberalism (in various forms and guises) is going 
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to grow in influence. In this context, we believe that geographers have a particularly 
important role to play in exposing the spatial limitations and contradictions of the 
neuroliberal project.  !!
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